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Human behaviour has always been assessed and judged in some ways, be it
through the most basic social interaction and benchmarking; through observation of
norm abidance in transparent and less transparent ways; or, recently, through digital
technologies. Wessel Reijers and Jens van t’ Klooster look at social credit systems
as a rule by ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’, based on structured observation and evaluation
of individual behaviour. Illustrating their arguments with the example of China’s
Social Credit System (SCS), they come to opposite conclusions about this model of
governance. I acknowledge the merits of van ‘t Klooster’s idea of the desert, implying
that a social credit system may have positive effects on distributive justice and offer
appropriate alternatives for price mechanisms in market economies. However, I
ardently oppose the use of surveillance mechanisms in regulating the relationship
between individuals and governance structures. As a result of three interrelated
dynamics, rather than creating ‘perfect’ citizens, social credit systems are more likely
to create calculated and passive subjects. 
Discipline by Design
First, social credit systems are tools for disciplining society. By design, they allow
a centralised authority to observe and evaluate individual behaviour. Their power
is in channelling human action towards the expected award and in avoidance of
the possible sanction. Awareness of surveillance is central to social credit systems,
as it can curtail free will and individual liberty. Just as in Bentham’s panopticon,
individuals have no certainty of whether they are observed at any given moment
or not. This motivates citizens to regulate their conduct under the assumption that
they are being watched and scrutinised. Hence, social credit systems have the
potential to create ‘docile minds’ – an extension of the Foucauldian notion of ‘docile
bodies’- through normalisation of subtle surveillance and acceptance of transparent
disciplinary mechanisms. A society composed of such ‘docile minds’ might lead
to smooth governance and reduce conflict horizontally (among individuals) and
vertically (between individuals and governance structures). If, for instance, a ‘perfect
society’ is characterised merely by the absence of conflict, then ‘docile minds’
are conducive to it. These ‘perfect citizens’ will, however, have internalised the
disciplining tools and forgotten their freedoms to such a degree that their ‘perfect
society’ will resemble a golden cage. A prison, paradoxically. And in no panopticon,
be it golden or digital, there is room for democracy because freedom is taken away
by default.  
A Society of Bystanders
Second, social credit systems leave little room for valorising non-rewardable virtuous
deeds or actions, but recompense utilitarian ‘good’ acts. Reijers rightly points out
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that the core idea behind an SCS is to ‘make good citizens, qua citizens, through
promoting certain civic virtues such as ‘trustworthiness’, but that the problem with
such an approach is the externalisation of the score to ‘virtuous action’. A ‘virtuous
action’, in itself, does not require a reputational or financial reward. Hence, any
rewardable ‘good deed’ would represent an action of instrumental conformity.
Allocating scores that do not take into account the context of individual behaviour
or action vis-à-vis rules will not create ‘perfect citizens’, but rather may give birth to
a society of bystanders and individuals acting exclusively on the basis of personal
utility. To illustrate this, imagine two scenarios where there exists a credit system
with a fixed list of deeds for which an individual receives positive and negative
scores. 
Scenario 1: Jack goes for a stroll around the neighbourhood. All of a
sudden, he sees an elderly woman having a heart attack on the other side
of the street. To offer her help (an action bearing no reward in terms of
social score), Jack needs to engage in civil disobedience – cross the street
illegally (an act for which he will receive a negative social score). Under the
social credit system, Jack would be a ‘perfect’ citizen if he kept on walking
and succumbed to bystander apathy of a ‘docile mind’. Yet, would it make
him less ‘perfect’ if he committed a non-rewardable deed of highest moral
value, which however presupposed a previous punishable action? 
Scenario 2: Jill works as a taxi driver.  She does not particularly like her
job and is often rude to customers (an act bearing a negative social score).
However, she knows that her blood donations (an action for which she
would receive credits) will even out her behaviour towards her clients.
Under the rules of the social credit system, Jill is a ‘perfect’ citizen, even
though her ‘good deeds’ are a matter of instrumental conformism rather
than expressions of virtue. 
Slavish Behaviour
Third, sanctions inherent in social credit systems have diffuse effects and as such
are likely to induce individuals to future ‘slavish behaviour’. Imagine Jack from the
example above. His score has been lowered because he was caught on camera
jaywalking to save the old lady. For the sake of the argument let’s also imagine
that because of his action Jack cannot travel to visit his relatives, has a 30 per
cent higher electricity bill, and he has been denied a loan. This means that not
only is Jack subject to a sanction, but also it is diffused over many segments of his
life. Once experienced the repercussions of his action at different levels, Jack will
be more likely to ‘play by the rules’. Furthermore, in a context where surveillance
of behaviour has been internalised, any public assessments of the quality of
governance are likely to be framed through false consciousness. This shift towards a
passive and obedient individual in the relationship with a central mandating authority
implies a move from a free decision-making citizen to a mere subject.
Perhaps my scepticism of the democratic potential of social credit systems is a direct
outcome of my post-communist background. The lived past of surveillance by secret
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service that I experienced in communist times was rather dystopian. The present
digital surveillance of online activities to assess and influence market behaviour (or,
as the case of Cambridge Analytica has shown, political choices) is, to say the least,
problematic. The ‘brave new worlds’ of literary works often depict gloomy digital
futures, which are a direct product of normalisation of control and coercion by a
central authority. To me, this points to the fact that one will find no ‘perfect citizens’
inside a panopticon, be it digital or not. Rather, it will be a golden cage hosting
‘docile minds’ – utilitarian bystanders and passive subjects. 
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